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Civil No. 16989 
------------------------------------------------------------------
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
- - --- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - -
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of a written 
agreement dated November 20, 1978 between the Defendant, JOHN 
NEW AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation (hereinafter in 
this brief referred to for purposes of convenience as New) and 
Plaintiff, NIXON & NIXON, INC., a Utah corporation (hereinafter 
in this brief referred to for purposes of convenience as Nixon), 
in which agreement New agreed to sell to Nixon and Nixon agreed to 
purchase from New certain undeveloped real property in Weber 
County, Utah. Nixon's Complaint was filed on June 6, 19 7 9. (R-1). 
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New filed an Answer to the Complaint on July 12, 1979, generally 
admitting the contract, denying its duty to specifically perform 
the contract and alleging that New and Nixon were joint venturers 
in development of said property. (R-12). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried in the District Court of Weber County, 
Utah, wherein it was filed, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, 
sitting without a jury, on February 14, 1980. At the conclusion 
of the trial, Judge Gould took the case under advisement. There-
after, on February 28, 1980, Judge Gould made and entered the 
following Memorandum Decision: 
The Court holds that the contract is so ambiguous that 
the rights of the defendant cannot be ascertained or en-
forced exce~t at the whim or caprice of the plaintiff as 
to the date of filing final plats, etc. The contract is 
therefore unenforceable~ 
Plaintiff may have ~u<!gment for amounts paid and defend-
ant may have Judgment voiding the purported contract. 
No Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Judgment were 
entered on said Memorandum Decision within the time for appeal 
of a final judgment under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and so, to protect the record, Nixon filed a Notice of Appeal on 
March 28, 1980 from Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision of Febru-
a ry 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 . ( R - 2 O ) • 
Thereafter, on June 9, 1980, Judge Goul'd made and entered 
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formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and ~ Judgment 
holding said Agreement vague and ambiguous, restoring the 
parties to their status before the Agreement, relieving New 
of any duty to convey the property to Nixon and awarding Nixon 
a money judgment for the principal amount theretofore paid by 
Nixon on the Contract in the amount of $76,928.63 and interest 
thereon to the date of the Judgment in the amount of $20,562.83. 
(R 34- 37). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Nixon requests that this Court reverse the Judgment entered 
by the Trial Court and direct the Trial Court to enter Judgment 
in favor of Nixon specifically enforcing 4nd directing New to 
comply with the Agreement between the parties dated November 20, 
1978. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
New was the owner of the real property subject of said 
Agreement of November 20, 1978 prior to the date of said Agree-
ment. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "B"). New had mortgaged the property 
to Commercial Security Bank (hereinafter Bank), had defaulted 
on said mortgage, the Bank had foreclosed the Mortgage and had a 
sheriff's sale thereon. (T. 127, lines 4-24). The six-month 
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right of redemption from the sheriff's sale expired November 
20, 1978 (T. 128, lines 26-28). 
New undertook, during the six-month redemption period, to 
find a buyer for the property who would pay enough to redeem 
the property from the sheriff's sale and to enable New to realize 
some money from the sale. (T. 127, lines 25-27). 
In pursuance of its efforts to sell the property, New came 
in contact with one Jerry Olson (hereinafter Olson). New told 
Olson he was in trouble on the property and solicited Olson's 
help in finding a Buyer. Olson requested a formal listing which 
New refused, preferring rat~er to give Olson a letter guaranteein 
Olson a commission if he sold the property. (T. 127, lines 1-30 
and 128, lines 1-12). A letter agreeing to pay a commission was 
given by New on October 26, 1978. (See Defendant's Exhibit "2"). 
No Buyer had been found for the property by New, Olson or 
anyone else by a date two (2) days before the redemption period 
expired. (Testimony of John New, T. 130, lines 18- 2 3) . When Ols 
informed New that the parties he had been negotiating with would 
not buy the property, Olson told New that Nixon would buy the 
property. (Testimony of John New, T. 130, lines 24-30). Nixon 
subsequently offered to purchase the property for $130,000.00 
of which approximately $76,000.00 would be used to redeem the 
property from sheriff's sale and the balance of $54,000.00 of whi 
would be paid to New" ... at a later date." (Testimony of John 
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New, T. 133, lines 3-15). 
Nixon and New then met on November 20, 1978, the date on 
which the redemption period expired, in the office of New's 
attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr. (hereinafter Hughes). Nixon was 
not represented by legal counsel at this meeting. (Testimony 
of Jack Nixon, T. 61, lines 4-15 and T. 62, lines 1-6). The 
parties there and then proceeded to negotiate the terms of the 
contract .. (Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 62, lines 10-13). One 
of Nixon's principal concerns was --obtaining a clear title to the 
property. (Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 62, lines 14-17). 
At this meeting, Hughes gave Nixon a copy of a preliminary 
title report on the property. A copy of the title report was 
introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "B". The title 
report showed numerous judgment liens against the property (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "B") The parties went over the report one 
item at a time and Hughes and New assured Nixon on each item that 
the various judgments and liens had either been paid or provision 
made for removing them from the title to the property and penciled 
notations made in the left hand margins as to the disposition of 
each item. (Testimony of Nixon T. 63, lines 13-17). ,\ t the 
trial New's counsel asked what Nixon intended to show by Plaintiff' 
Exhibit "B" and the penciled notations in the margin of Schedule 
B thereunder. To this inquiry, Nixon's attorney replied: 
"We intend to show that they had represented the 
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title to the property was either clear or could be 
made clear, and that they would give us a clear, unen-
cumbered and marketable title to the property. That 
was their representation." 
Whereupon New' s attorney stated: "There is no dispute about 
that. (Testimony of Nixon T. 64, line 29). 
The negotiations and drafting were done under pressure of 
the 5:00 p.m. deadline for redemption and the contract which is 
the subject of this dispute was finally signed just in·time for 
Nixon, New and Hughes to go to the sheriff's office and redeem th, 
property with money paid by Nixon just ahead of the 5:00 p.m. 
redemption deadline. (Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 69, lines 1-19 
The contract between the parties was introduced as Plaintiff 
Exhibit "A" at the trial. The contract provides for a purchase 
price of $130,000.00 of which $76,928.73 was to be paid down and 
was in fact paid to redeem the property from sheriff's sale. 
In paragraph 2, th~ contract provides that: 
2. Buyer shall convey to Seller title to the described 
property, free and clear of all liens and shall provide for 
Buyer a policy of title insurance, insuring the title of 
Buyer. 
New's counsel stipulated at the trial that this paragraph 
contained a scrivener's error and should, in fact, have said "Sel 
shall convey to Buyer ... " (T. 4 2, lines 16- 29). 
The contract then prov1ded, among other things as follows: 
3. Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a subdivision 
plat and proceed with engineering and development. of the 
property at a commercially reasonable speed. 
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4. Six mo~ths from the filing of the final plat, Buyer 
sh~ll par t9 ~e~ler the difference between the redemption 
price paid in1t1ally and One Hundred and Thirty Thousand 
Dollars ($130,000.00). 
9. Buyer shall execute a note in favor of Seller consistent 
with the terms of this agreement. In the event, Buyer 
has not paid the Seller the amounts due and payable hereunder 
within four years from the filing of final plat, the note 
shall be in default and Seller may proceed according to 
lP. 
Subsequent to the redemption, Jack and Ezra Nixon appeared 
with Hughes and John New on two occasions in Judge Hyde's Court 
in Ogden to settle an issue relative to one of the liens on the 
property. (Testimony of Jack Nixon, T. 70, lines 11-30 and 71, 
lines 1-15). Immediately following the second court hearing the 
Nixons, New and Hughes had the following conversation: 
Q. Did ybu have a conversation with Mr. New and Mr. Hughes 
then following that? 
A. Yeah, we talked right here on this floor for a little 
bit, and we headed back over to Hughes' office. And I said 
now what do we need to do to get this thing wrapped up? 
And in fact, we stopped for the light right here on the 
corner of Kiesel, I guess it is Kiesel, anyway this little 
short street right here north of the courthouse, and we 
were talking there, John and I and dad. And John and I 
said then--! said Don, now what do we need to do now to 
get the deed and title policy on this property. And he 
said well, he says, I have got to file the redemption 
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certificate. And he said I have got to get the title compar 
now to· give us--issue us a new policy of title insurance 
showing these liens are cleaned up on it. And I asked him 
how long that would be. And he again assured me that it 
would be shortly forthcoming, within 30 days or so. And 
I said well, get that note typed up for John, and let's 
get it signed and get this thing put to bed. And he said 
I will do it. (T. 71, lines 18-30 and 72, lines 1-7). 
In fact, Hughes never prepa~~d and submit:t_e_d a _note to Nixon 
as provided in paragraph 9 of the agreement, althoug~ Nixon w~ 
at all times ready, willing and able to sign the note. (Testimorr 
of Nixon T. 69, lines 27-30 and 70, lines 1-10). Nor did New 
ever tender to Nixon a clear title and title insurance policy 
t o Nixon . (Test i mo n y o f John New , T . 7 4 , 1 in es 2 6 - 3 0 and 7 5 , 
lines 1-5). 
Following the signing of the contract, Nixon took some pre-
liminary steps to develope the property even though clear title t 
the property had not passed to it. These included hiring two lan 
designers in January, 19 79 (T. 7 5, 1 ines 11- 21) , hi ring an engine 
in March (T. 76, lines 6-22), preparation of subdivision sketches 
and soil tests (T. 76, lines 23-27) and going to the property twi 
with the engineer (T. 77, lines 11-27). 
In May of 1979, Nixon discovered that New was proceeding 
to subdivide the property subject of said contract as though N~ 
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was still the owner thereof. (T. 77, lines 28-30 and T. 78, lines 
1- 5) . 
When Jack Nixon contacted John New to see why he was doing 
this, John New replied " ... that's my property ... " and" ... I am 
going to develope it ... " (T. 80, lines 11 and 12). Jack Nixon 
then stated he had purchased the property and made a down payment 
to which John New replied" ... ! am going to consider it a loan." 
( T . 8 0 , 1 in es 2 6 and 2 7 ) . 
Jack Nixon thereupon caused a title search of the property 
to be made which disclosed that title to the property was in 
New and that the title was encumbered by a mortgage, a mechanics 
lien, a Federal Tax lien, numerous judgment liens and a possible 
boundary conflict. A copy of this title report is a part of the 
record as Plaintiff's Exhibit "F". On June 4, 1980, Nixon filed a 
lis pendens against the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G") 
and on June 6, 1980 filed an action for specific performance 
of the contract. 
The case was tried to Judge Calvin Gould on February 14, 
1980 and on February 22, 1980 Judge Gould gave a written i\lemorandum 
Decision (R. 19). The Memorandum Decision did not direct the 
preparation of Findings of Fact or a Judgment and Decree and 
so Nixon, in order to protect its record, treated the Judgment 
as a final judgment and appealed therefrom. 
Thereafter New's attorney prepared proposed Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment. Nixon made writte 
objection thereto and filed a copy of said objection with Judge 
Gould (R 28~30). On June 4, 1980, counsel for both parties appear 
before Judge Gould on his order and reviewed the proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree and Judge 
Gould thereupon, on June 9, 1980, made Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree. (R 34-37). 
In fact two Judgments were entered by Judge Gould. The first 
Judgment follows the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
a part of the same document as the Finding of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law . ( R - 3 6) 
-The second Judgment is the one prepared by Mr. Richards, 
New's attorney, in April, 1980. While the two Judgments vary sligh· 
tney both have the effect of declaring the contract void for ambi-
. ( guity. 
Aft.er the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgmen· 
were entered~ Nixon moved this Court to augment the record on 
appeal to include said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgments and to treat Nixon's appeal from the Trial Court's 
Memorandum Decision as an appeal from both the Trial Court's Memo: 
andum Decision of February 28, 1980 and from its Judgments of June 
9, 1980. This motion was granted and an order entered thereon. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT AMBIGUOUS 
AND VAGUE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT DEFINITNESS IN THE CONTRACT 
TO WARRANT SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT THEREOF. 
The provision of the contract which the trial Court appar-
ently found to be vague and ambiguous was paragraph 3 which 
provides: 
3. Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a subdivision 
Plat and proceed with engineering and development of the 
property- at a commercially reasonable speed. (Plaintiff's 
E xh i b i t " C" ) . 
Because this provision did not specify a time by which 
Nixon would prepare a subdivision plat and because the contract 
did not require Nixon to pay New money until six months after the 
subdivision plat was filed the Court concluded that Nixon could 
forestall paying New indefinately, simply by not filing a sub-
division plat. From this the Trial Court concluded, "The contract i~ 
so ambiguous that the·rights of the Defendant cannot be ascertained 
or enforced except at the whim or caprice of the Plaintiff, and 
to enforce the contract as the Plaintiff now requests would be to 
deprive the Defendant of any equity he may have had in the property 0 
(Conclusions of Law, R-36). 
case: 
The following foundational principles are relevant to this 
1. "It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract 
should be interpeted most strongly against the party 
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who has selected that ·language, especially where he 
seeks to use such language to defeat the contract or 
it~ operation ... also, in case of doubt or ambiguity 
a contract will be construed most strongly against the 
party who drew or prepared it, or whose attorney drew 
or prepared it. (17 Am. Jur. 2nd on Contracts, Section 
276 P. 689-90). See also Bryant vs. Deseret News Publi~hi 
Company (Utah) 233 P.2d 35 . 
The contract in question in this case was drawn and prepared 
by New's attorney (Testimony of New, T. 150, lines 24-28. Testi-
many of Hughes, T. 116, lines 25-30). 
2. " ... if a contract is capable of a construction which 
will make it valid, legal, effective, and enforceable, 
it will be given that construction if the contract is 
ambiguous or uncertain. A constru-ction which renders 
the contract valid is preferred to one which renders 
it invalid, and it will not be -construed so as to be 
invalid unless that construction is required by the 
terms of the agreement in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances." (17/Am. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section 
254, pg. 648-650). See also Schofield vs. ZCMI (Utah) 
39 p. 2d 34 2. 
3. "A contract being construed is to be considered as a 
whole and the meaning gathered from the entire context, 
and not from particular words, phrases, or clauses, 
or from detached or isolated portions of the contract .... 
Moreover, the entire agreement is to be considered, 
to determine the meaning of each part .... All clauses 
and provisions of the contract should, if possible, 
be so construed as to harmonize with one another, and 
all the language of a contract should be construed so 
as to subserve, and not subvert, the general intention 
of the parties. -The whole agreement should, if possible, 
be construed so as to conform to an evident consistent 
purpose. Where a contract as a whole discloses a given 
intention and certain words or clauses would, if taken 
literally, defeat the intention, they will be interpreted 
~f possible, so as to be consistent with the general 
intent." (17 Arn. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section 258, 
pg. 658-660) . 
. 
"It is a fundamental rule of contract construction that 
the entire contract, and each and all of its parts and 
provisions, must be given meaning, and force and effect, 
it that can consistently and reasonably be done. An 
~nterpre~a~ion w~ich gives reasonable meaning to all 
its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves 
a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable. So 
far as reasonably possible, effect will he crim:~n +,... 
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all the language and to every word, expression, phrase, 
and clause of the agreement. A construction will not 
be given to one part of a contract which will annul 
another part, unless such a result is fairly inescapable .. · 
(17 Am. Jur. 2d on Contracts, Section 259, pg. 660-662). 
The generally accepted definition of ambiguity in a contract 
... an uncertainty of meaning in the terms of a 
written instrument. It means wanting clearness or 
definiteness; difficult to comprehend or distin-
guish; of doubtful import. State Bank of Wilbur 
~· Phillips (Washington) 119 P.2cr;-Q64T. 
Ambiguity in a written instrument does not appear until 
application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of 
the instrument leaves it genuinely uncertain which of two or more 
meanings is the proper meaning. Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. 
vs. Neel, (Kansas) 337 P.Zd 992. 
Taken as a whole the contract in this case is not ambiguous. 
It clearly express~s a purchase price of $130,000.00 (pa~agraph 
4) and a down payment of $76,~28. 7~ (paragraph 1), Because 
there were liens against the property which had to be cleared 
before the property could be developed the parties established 
by the contract a framework by which the property could be 
developed and, as developed, New could be paid. Thus the contract 
first provides that New would convey to Nixon a clear title to 
the property and a title insurance policy. Hughes testified in 
answer to Mr. Hoggan's question'' ... you wouldn't expect anyone 
to proceed ~ith development of the property and the expenditure 
of a large sum of money until he had clear title to it, would 
you?" as follows: 
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No, I think he would want assurance of his return. (T. 125 
lines 24-28). 
Under a fair interpretation of all provisions of the contrac1 
and construing the contract so as to give validity to all of its 
provisions, the contract is not ambiguous. The provisions the 
trial court found to be ambiguous are not of duplicitous meaning. 
Taken in the context of the entire contract they simply require 
Nixon to begin and proceed with development of the property after 
New has tendered clear marketable title to Nixon. The Trial Court 
in effect, ignored the provisions of the contract requiring New· 
to give a clear title, leap-frogged these provisions, took the 
provisions requiring Nixon to develope the property out of the 
context of the contract and, standing thereon alone, declared 
those provisions vague and ambiguous. 
Had the Trial Court applied the rules of construction requiri 
all provisions of the contract to be construed together and favor1 
an interpretation which validated instead of invalidated the contr 
the seeming ambiguity would not have existed. The contract, const 
ed as a whole, shows an orderly manner in which the parties were 
to accomplish their purposes, i.e. first clear the title, then 
begin to develope the property and if, in the course of developmen 
unforseen obstacles arose, adjust the Sellers equity by an amount 
necessary to solve the unforseen difficulties. If the contract 
was not as artfully drafted as would be desired it must be remem-
bered that it was drafted under intense time pressure by New's 
attorney and if there is any question of ambiguity that question 
should be resolved against New and in favor of preserving the 
parties' bargain, not nullifying it. 
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Nixon submits that this Court's recent decision in Reed vs. 
Alvey (April 21, 1980) 610 P.2d 1374 is dispositive of the issue 
raised by t~is appeal. 
In the Reed case, one Lambert as agent for Alvey, procurred 
an earnest money offer and a $500.00 deposit from Reed to purchase 
one of 4 four-plex units which Alvey proposed to construct on 
lots at the intersection of Hillview Drive and Ninth East in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Alvey signed the earnest money agreement and 
endorsed the $500.00 deposit to Lambert as payment on his commission. 
There were delays in construction of the unit and when Reed couldn't 
make contact with Alvey, he filed suit for specific performance of 
the earnest money agreement. 
The Trial Court held the agreement vague and ambiguous and 
declined to order specific performance. The provisions apparently 
relied on by the Trail Court were that the description was uncer-
tain, the specific unit the Plaintiff was to purchase was not iden-
tified and the manner for payment stated "terms to be arranged." 
This Court stated as follows: 
Before specific performance will be employed by the courts 
to enforce a contract the terms of the agreement must be 
reasonably certain so the parties know what is required of 
them, and definite emough that the courts can delineate the 
intent of the contracting parties. 
The Court then went on to hold that the description, though 
" ... concededly vague and incomplete on its face ... defines the 
subject matter in question in sufficient detail to support specific 
performance." (Ibid. p. 1377) 
On the issue of which lot the Plaintiff had purchased, the 
Court found the dealings of the parties had sufficiently establish-
ed the identity of the lot purchased by Plaintiff. The Court 
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also found that the provision "terms to be arranged" allowed the da 
Plaintiff to pay in full upon performance by the Defendant. ~ 
Finally, where it appeared that the Defendant had encumbere1 to 
the property title, this Court stated: 
Specific performance of the contract requires· the removal ~ 
of this encumbrance prior to the Plaintiff taking possessio1 
of the property. This can be accomplished either by a thE 
reduction in the purchase price, in the amount of the encum· 
brance, or payment of the total price after Defendants remo\ ::: 
the encumb ranee. (Ibid. p. 13 80) 
~ :. 
If the Court on the facts in Reed vs. Alvey can decree speci 
performance, cert ain~y it can and should in the case at bar find ·" 
sufficient definiteness from all the terms of the contract and th · 
dealings of the parties to spec·ifically enforce the 
parties' contract. 
POINT II. CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES REQUIRED NEW TO CONVEY A CLEAR TITLE TO NIXON BEFORE 
NIXON WAS OBLIGATED TO DEVELOPE THE PROPERTY AND NIXON COULD ; 
NOT BE IN DEFAULT ON THE CONTRACT UNTIL IT HAD FAILED OR REFl 
ED TO DEVELOPE THE PROPERTY AFTER OBTAINING A CLEAR TITLE 
THERETO. 
It is an undisputed fact that New did not have clear title 
to the property when the contract was entered into. The title 
report, Pla·intiff' s Exhibit "B", shows numerous mortgages and 
liens against the property. 
It is an undisputed fact that the liens were to be removed 
by New and that New would give Nixon a clear title to the property 
Certainly it was not Nixon's duty to clear the title. Hughes ackno 
ledged that development should not be expected to proceed until 
the title was cleared (T. 125, lines 24-28), and that it was his 
duty to clear the title (T. 117, lines 1-29). The title report 
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dated May 23, 1979 (Plaintiff's Exhibit "F") shows the title was 
never cleared and New testified he had never tendered clear title 
to the property to Nixon (T. 150, lines 16-18). 
It is an undisputed fact that immediately prior to the date 
this suit was commenced, to-wit: on May 23, 1979, the title to 
the property was still heavily encumbered by liens and mortgages 
and that most of these liens and mortgages were the same ones that 
were against the property when the parties entered into the contract~ 
(Compare the title report dated July 28, 1978, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"B" with the title report dated May 23, 1979, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"F".) 
The trial court ignored these facts in construing the contractQ 
In effect the court released New from its obligation to convey 
a clear title, took one or two provisions of the contract out 
of context and concluded that the contract was ambiguous since 
it placed no time limit on Nixon developing the property. In 
fact, until Nixon had clear title to the property it was under 
no obligation to proceed with development and even though Hughes 
admitted it would be unreasonable to expect Nixon to proceed with 
development until it had clear title to the property. 
In addition, the Court ignored the fact that Nixon had done 
considerable work toward beginning development of the property 
even though it had not yet received clear title to the property. 
(See page 8 of this brief and the reference to the Transcript 
there cited.) 
POI~T III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE 
POWERS TO VOID THE CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF NEW INAS:MUCH AS NEW 
DID NOT DO EQUITY. 
I I 
I ' 
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It is important to weigh and consider the following: 
1. It was Nixon who had invested $76,928.73 in the property 
New's equity, assuming all of it would go into New's pocket and 
none of it would go to pay liens against the property, was approx: 
rnately $54,000,00. Nixon stood to lose more than New in the 
deal if development of the property was delayed and Nixon's poten 
tial loss was hard cash. New's loss was of a potential equity 
which he would never even had a chance of realizing had Nixon 
not contracted with New. New testified in cross examination as 
follows: 
Q. (By Hoggan) Now what would have happened it 5:00 o'clock 
had rolled around on Novernher 20 ,· 1978, and you hadn't had 
$77,000.00? 
A. It would have become Commercial Security's property, 
or whoever bid on it. 
Q. And what would you have gotten out of it? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. Did you have $77,000.00 at 5:0·0 o'clock on November 20, 
1978 of your own money? 
A. No. CT. 148, lines 18-27) 
2. This is a case in equity. Two fundamental maxims of 
equity are: "He who seeks equity must do equity" (27 Arn. Jur. 
2d on Equity, Section 131, P. 660) and "He who comes into equity 
must come with clean hands." (27 Arn. Jur. 2d on Equity, Section 
136, P. 666). 
New is in violation of both maxims. New cannot ask the Court 
to excercise its equitable powers to in effect rescind its contrac 
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wi th Nixon when New has not itself performed the contract by 
tendering clear title to the property. New took all of the 
benefits of the contract by accepting a down payment which enabled 
him to escape loss of the property and his equity therein altogether 
by redeeming the property. It is inequitable conduct on· his part, 
after having had the benefit of the contract, to now repudiate it. 
Nor can New be said to have clean hands. New took matters 
into his own hands without seeking judicial assistance. He made 
himself the judge of the contract by repudiating it and proceeding 
to develope a property he had sold and received almost $77,000.00 
on. Nixon found out about New's action, not from New, but from 
its independent sources of information. 
CONCLUSION 
The contract of the parties, construed as a whole, is not 
ambiguous. It can and should be construed to give it validity 
rather than invalidity. To the extent the contract could be 
considered ambiguous, it should have the ambiguity construed against 
New, since his attorney prepared it. The court, in exercise of its 
equitable powers should not penalize Nixon and reward New. Nixon 
has done nothing in derogation of the contract, but stands ready 
and willing to perform the contract. New, by contrast, has done 
nothing to perform the contract. The Court should specifically 
enforce the contract by requiring New to clear the title to the 
property, convey clear title thereto to Nixon by Warranty Deed 
and to provide Nixon with a policy of title insurance on the property 
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Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
/s/ L. Brent Hoggan 
L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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